Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 47

Issue 3

Article 2

Summer 6-1-1990

The Truth May Not Set You Free
Robert M. O'Neil

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert M. O'Neil, The Truth May Not Set You Free, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 515 (1990).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol47/iss3/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

WASHINGTON AND LEE

LAW REVIEW
Volume 47

Summer 1990

Number 3

THE TRUTH MAY NOT SET YOU FREE
ROBERT M. O'NEI.*
I am deeply honored to have been asked to be this year's Telford
Lecturer.' The series bears a most distinguished name. While I regret not
having met Mr. Telford, I appreciate how well his generosity has brought
a number of eminent visitors to Washington and Lee. I am delighted to
join so distinguished a roster.
Let me begin with a simple question. In the interests of free expression
and anonymity, I shall not ask for a show of hands. But I hope you will
give careful thought to this query: "Does the first amendment fully protect
the right to speak and publish the truth?" You may well be tempted to
answer in the affirmative-recalling, for example, that truth is an almost
universal defense to libel claims and charges of perjury. Yet if you answered
"no," or "not always," you were correct-probably to an even greater
degree than you might have supposed. In fact, speaking or writing the truth
may clash with governmental or private protection of at least four separate
interests of which I shall speak this evening--intellectual and literary property; privacy and publicity; judicial administration- and national security.
I.

INTELLECTUAL AND LITERARY PROPERTY

Questions concerning the scope of first amendment protection of speech
have been much in the news of late. A recent and much noted case offers
a logical staring point. About a month ago the United States Supreme
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Court refused to review a copyright decision which writers and publishers
fear has profound first amendment implications. 2 The dispute revolves about
a recently published, rather critical biography of Church of Scientology
founder L. Ron Hubbard. The book includes quotations from unpublished
diaries, letters and other documents-among them a letter to the FBI in
which Hubbard denounces his wife as a spy, a proposal to convert Scientology into a religion to gain tax benefits, and a letter to his daughter in
which Hubbard falsely denies being her father.
The lower federal courts ruled that such unpublished materials may
not, under the copyright laws, be used without permission.3 While copyright
laws permit what is called "fair use"-brief quotations from published
works in reviews, for example-that privilege does not extend to unpublished
material. The effect of such a restrictive judgment may reach well beyond
the literary world; the Washington Post observed editorially the next day,
"the Hubbard biography primarily involves questions of facts, many of
which can be best settled by quotation from Mr. Hubbard's own writings.
of copyright protection trespasses on the public's
Here a broad application
'4
right to know."
The issue is clearly not one of first impression. Five years ago the
Supreme Court held that The Nation could not use purloined excerpts from
former President Gerald Ford's memoirs, about to be published in book
form.' Two years later a federal judge required the publisher of a biography6
of J. D. Salinger to delete unauthorized portions of the novelist's letters.
Both courts recognized the degree to which a copyright claim may inhibit
or constrain the right to print or to speak the truth.
Paradoxical though it seems, this may be just what the framers of the
Constitution intended. The clause which protects intellectual property does,
after all, appear in the text of the Constitution, while protection for free
expression appears only in the amendments. There is no evidence that the
framers meant to nullify the new copyright clause by adopting a Bill of
Rights. Legal protection for the writings of an author-whether published
or not-gains meaning and effect only through occasional restraint upon
another's free use of those writings. Yet, as Professor Melville Nimmer
(expert on both subjects) once remarked, the constitutional tension between
protection and publication creates "a largely ignored paradox." 7
The paradox has brought an uneasy truce, as the recent cases revealespecially when they involve highly visible persons like Ford, Hubbard and
Salinger. The competing interests are of a very high order. The ability to
recount freely the life of a celebrity seems the essence of a free press. If
2.
3.
873 F.2d
4.
5.
6.
7.

873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1168 (1990).
New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (1988), aff'd,
576 (2d Cir. 1989).
Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 1990, at A22, col 1.
471 U.S. 539 (1985).
811 F.2d 90 (2d. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
M. NiMMER, Nmn4MR ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH 2-56 (1984).
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the account is completely truthful, the interest gains an even higher stature.
Yet the national interest in promoting and rewarding creativity reserves to
the creator the control of unpublished material. Preservation of privacy for
the creator reinforces that interest. Thus any attempt to balance or accommodate in this area must start by recognizing the exceptionally high stakes
on both sides.
While one might question the force of the media claim in the case of
a former president or a religious leader, such doubts cannot cloud the case
of a genuine author like Salinger. There is no indication that the framers
meant to limit copyright protection to works of great literary merit. Indeed,
even material so offensive that it can be banned as obscene is typically
entitled to copyright-illustrating graphically the contrast both in purpose
and in scope between the two constitutional clauses we seek to balance.
Intellectual property and free expression can be accommodated in other
ways. Copyright law does not protect ideas, but rather the particular
expression of ideas. Compilations of facts, for example, attain copyright
with great difficulty and only with the addition of some original creative
component. Thus critics of the recent Hubbard decision are not quite fair
in claiming that courts have cut off access to the facts. Equally important,
writings that have passed into the public domain may never reclaim protection-even if public distribution happens inadvertently, as it did several
years ago with a collection of Martin Luther King speeches carelessly
distributed without the required copyright notice.
Moreover, the duration of copyright for published works is limited by
statute-though unpublished materials are protected through 2002 under
federal law.' Finally, a defense of "fair use" will defeat certain claims
when information of great public interest is in issue. In what may be the
most celebrated such case, a federal judge allowed unauthorized copying
and use of the famous home movie which turned out to contain the only
view of President John Kennedy being shot during the fateful Dallas
motorcade. 9 The judgment relied in part on the statutory defense of fair
use, but cited strong first amendment overtones. It should now be apparent
that the qualification of copyright is substantial when the opposing interest
is that of newsworthiness.' 0
Yet the tension remains. Literary or intellectual
property marks a major exception to the assertion that one
may freely speak or print the truth. While the Hubbard decision technically
governs but one federal circuit, publishers and authors elsewhere have
already altered their permission practices-producing what first amendment

8. 17 U.S.C. § 303 (1977).
9. 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
10. For additional reading on the doctrine of fair use, see generally W. PArRY, THE
FAr UsE PrVILEGE IN COPYMGHT LAw (1985); Leval, Commentary: Toward a Fair Use

Standard, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105 (1990); Weinreb, Fair'sFair: A Comment on the Fair Use
Doctrine, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1137 (1990).
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lawyer Floyd Abrams calls "the most extreme form of self-censorship. ' ""
historian, fears that such a ruling
Taylor Branch, last year's Pulitzer Prize
"would be a severe blow to history.''' 2
One might expect Congress to come to the aid of the literary and
information community-for example, by broadening the scope of fair use,
or otherwise marking a clearer path of access to such information. Such a
step could reconcile the contending forces in a way that seems more
congenial to first amendment freedoms, and would at least approach full
protection for publishing the truth. Yet I think it unlikely that either
Congress or the Supreme Court will intercede to give much solace to writers,
scholars or publishers. The current (albeit uncomfortable) balance has
evolved over decades, and could not easily be disturbed. Thus the paradox
remains-and perhaps it is exactly what Mr. Jefferson and his fellow framers
meant us to endure.
II.

PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY

Copyright is not the only source of confusion in our quest for the truth
about truth. Let us move from the New York publishing world to a county
fair in Northeast Ohio. The star of the midway is one Hugo Zacchini, who
performs several times each day as "the Human Cannonball." His claim
of notoriety-and his sole livelihood-is a fifteen-second routine in which
he is literally ejected from a cannon. Large signs warn that photographing
or filming the routine is forbidden. One afternoon, however, a camera crew
from a Cleveland television station defies the ban. Zacchini's act is featured
that evening on the 6:00 news across northeast Ohio. He promptly sues the
station for an unlawful appropriation of his professional property.
The Ohio courts recognized that such a claim might exist, but ruled
that broadcasters enjoyed a constitutional privilege to report accurately on
matters of public interest. 3 A sharply divided United States Supreme Court
reversed, and found in Zacchini's favor.' 4 The Justices began by reaffirming
the right of the media to report matters of public interest, even when their
accounts might invade personal privacy or place the subject ina false light.' 5
The case of the Cleveland television station might have seemed an unusually
strong one; there was no hint of disparagement, and the filmed routine had
occurred before thousands of spectators rather than in the privacy of the
home.
Common law had, however, long recognized a limited "right of publicity" which protected the commercial value of performances by entertainers
and athletes. Such protection might occasionally limit access of the media,

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Wash. Post, Feb. 21, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (final ed.).
Id.
47 Ohio St.2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. at 573.
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though the high Court had never before addressed the latent conflict of
values.
For a bare majority of the Justices, Zacchini's interest in protecting the
value of his performance outweighed the claim of the media to film and
broadcast it.16 Entertainment might, of course, constitute news, but a
performer's interest in protecting the value of his performance also deserved
a measure of protection which could at times conflict with the first amendment. But to film and broadcast a performer's entire act without his
permission was another matter; it seemed to the majority so clear a threat
to his livelihood that damages might be given without abridging the rights
of the media.
The four dissenters were deeply troubled by the implication that a
"station's ordinary news report may give rise to substantial liability. ' 17
Using the footage for competing or commercial reasons would be one thing,
but using it simply as news was quite another-especially when the subject
himself eagerly sought publicity in one form but then tried to control or
prevent it in other forms. 8 As the depth of division within the Court
suggests, Zacchini was a case not only unique but exceedingly difficult
because of the inescapable tension between free expression and personal
rights.
Let me posit several variations on Zacchini, a case I have long delighted
in teaching. Suppose the day of the filming is damp, and the gunpowder
fails to ignite. What is filmed-and broadcast that evening as though it
were vintage Zacchini-shows a limp figure drooping from the mouth of
the canon rather than a human trajectory being hurled the normal distance
from the shooting site. While the film would indeed be an accurate record
of what occurred on the midway that afternoon, I suspect most courts
would find its broadcast actionable disparagement if it implied this was a
normal Zacchini performance. Truthful it might be in recording a single
event-but truthful it would not be in its larger implication about the
performer's talent and skill.
Let me offer an even more difficult variation. A slow motion camera
reveals that much of the impact of the performance on the live audience at
the fair is an illusion. When viewed at slow speed, the ejection from the
canon is far less dazzling-and also less dangerous-than it appears without
benefit of such a camera. To play the tape in slow motion on the evening
news would be truthful in one sense-but potentially actionable, I believe,
because of the way in which technology undermines the value of a routine
which dazzles the naked eye. This variation is admittedly more difficult
than the first, but is comparable to the degree it places the performer in a
false light.
My next variation is a bit different: The manager of the county fair
sees commercial potential in the Zacchini routine, and uses excerpts (without
16. Zacchini at 578.
17. Id. at 580.
18. Id. at 581.
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the performer's permission) for promotional purposes. When Zacchini seeks
damages, most courts would view this as a case of misappropriation or
invasion of another's right of publicity. In a commercial context-whether
or not between competitors-such an unauthorized use of a performance
would almost universally yield redress, and without abridging freedoms of
expression.
The last variation is the most intriguing. An industrious camera crew
discovers that a Cleveland banker, having seen Zacchini's act, has been
secretly practicing human cannonballing on weekends in his own backyard.
Even his Lakewood neighbors are unaware of the source of occasional
muffled booms that echo about the block. With a ladder and a long lens,
the television crew records from the adjacent sidewalk several minutes of
practice cannon ejections by the banker. He is mortified when the tape is
played, without his knowledge or permission, on the evening news. Here
again we have a case of truth-an accurate account of an event of potential
interest to viewers-though not involving a celebrity, and certainly not a
professional performer who, like Zacchini himself, could be said to have
sought publicity on his own terms.
This third variation involves the issue of what I would call pure privacy.
There are a number of such cases, though most involve some claim either
of disparagement or of misappropriation. Relatively rare is the case in which
a person like our Cleveland banker simply wishes to conceal a truthful facet
of his or her private life from public exposure. A few courts have allowed
recovery for unconscionable invasions of an "inner core of intimacy"-as
in the successful suit of a California woman who took an assault complaint
to a police station, where officers insisted she undress, photographed her
naked and circulated the resulting photos.19 The woman's federal civil rights
act claim prevailed as a most unusual recognition of a privacy interest of
high order, set against a minimal public interest in dissemination.
The classic case of the person wishing to be left alone is that of a
recluse who struggled to escape his early life as a putative genius, and had
for years managed to do so. Then came a New Yorker profile, which
resurrected the total (in many ways tragic) life story. The report was
apparently in all respects brutally accurate; indeed, its painful impact on
the unwilling subject was heightened by its very veracity. He brought suit
against the magazine, citing a New York law which protects privacy more
broadly than do those of most other states. 20
The federal appellate court ultimately denied relief, ostensibly applying
the terms of the statute, but fully aware of latent first amendment concerns. 2'
Courts later struggled with a similar issue in the case involving a Vietnam
veteran who won fame and honor for protecting President Ford from an

19. York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
20. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
21. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711
(1940).
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assailant's bullet, but to whose great embarrassment was later reported to
be homosexual.Y
In the later cases, recovery has so consistently been denied-on statutory
much more than constitutional grounds-that (as Professor Dorsey Ellis
remarked several years ago) the "very existence [of the cause of action] is
in doubt, at least outside the law reviews." 23 Yet there have been a very
few exceptions, and the need for guidelines remains. Where the subject is
or has been a public figure-as is arguably the case with both the reclusive
genius and the brave but gay veteran-the media interest in probing a
private life is surely greater than in the case of a complete unknown.
Indeed, even where such disclosures are false, the constitutional privilege
of fair comment compels a plaintiff to show either actual malice or reckless
disregard of the truth before damages can be awarded. Where there is no
claim of falsehood or distortion, but simply intrusion, the immunity of
meddlesome media should be even clearer.
Thus, Professor Thomas I. Emerson in his classic first amendment
treatise concedes an "inner core of intimacy"-unconsented photos of a
woman in childbirth, for example, but then argues: "Beyond this point...
disclosure of embarrassing facts or fictionalization would not be embraced
by the legal system of privacy." 24 Few cases seem at variance with that
judgment. The time may well have come for unqualified judicial recognition
of a constitutional defense of truth, whatever statutes may purport to say
to the contrary.
III. ADmISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Privacy interests may receive protection in a quite different setting.
Many states forbid publication of such sensitive information as the identity
of a rape victim or a juvenile offender-not only to shield the individual,
but also to enhance the administration of justice. Where those two interests
converge, the inherent tension with free expression is even greater.
The courts have had several recent occasions to address that tension.
The United States Supreme Court has considered the issue four times in
the past decade and a half.2 The three earlier cases-two dealing with
juvenile offenders and one with a rape victim-so consistently exonerated
the media that last year an accused newspaper could argue the Court had

22. Sipple v. Chronical Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 201 Cal. Rptr. 665
(1984).
23. .Ellis, Damages and the Privacy Tort: Sketching a "Legal Profile", 64 Iowa L. Rev.
1111, 1133 (1979).
24. EmRSON, Tna SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 557 (1970).
25. See The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989) (upholding right of newspaper
to publish name of rape victim); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979)
(protecting right of newspaper to publish identity of youth charged as juvenile offender);
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (upholding right of media to
publish name and photograph of youth involved in a juvenile proceeding). Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (protecting right of newspaper to publish identity of rape

victim).
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created "a broader first amendment principle that the press may never be
punished, civilly or criminally, for publishing the truth." 26
In deciding this latest case in the newspaper's favor last summer, the
Justices stopped just short of declaring so sweeping a precept. The competing
forces, they explained,, must be weighed in each case. Where the media had
lawfully obtained truthful information of manifest public interest, only a
governmental interest of the highest order would justify penalties or damages
for publishing that information. 27 No such interest existed here, despite the
strong goals of shielding the hapless
victim and furthering the interests of
2
justice through confidentiality.
The limits of the current standard remain unclear, despite the volume
of litigation. While the Court has not upheld sanctions even in the most
appealing of circumstances, neither have the Justices been willing to adopt
a per se standard protecting publication of truth under any and all conditions. It is no longer easy to conjure the case that will create the exception,
at least so long as the information in question is accurate, has not been
illegally obtained, and has public interest. Absent any of those ingredients,
the outcome might well be different-but that possibility does not tell us
much of what we need to know. We must continue to wonder why the
Court stops just short of a broader and more satisfying principle.
IV.

NATIONAL SECURITY

The most difficult context of all for truth is understandably that of

national security. Let me illustrate with a statute that is in fact premised
on the notion that certain truths can be extremely dangerous. In 1982
Congress made it a federal crime to reveal the identity or location of United
States undercover agents in foreign lands. 29 Such information may have not
only prurient appeal, but also may reflect substantial and legitimate public
interest-to determine how many such agents the United States has in any
given foreign capital, or what kinds of people we deploy there. Yet even
most first amendment absolutists would accept the need to deter disclosures
that would immediately imperil the lives of our agents abroad. They would
also recognize the narrow focus of such a law, and the slight risk of
confusion or uncertainty to a conscientious editor or publisher.
This statute is not alone among federal prohibitions on publishing truth
that could harm national security. There are laws that proscribe publishing
certain photographs of drawings of military installations. Other statutes
forbid knowing and wilful publication of classified information concerning
cryptographic systems or data obtained from intelligence activities. While
such laws have seldom been tested, and never directly before the Supreme
Court, the case for their validity is quite different from the case that could

26.
27.
28.
29.

The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603, 2608 (1989).
Id. at 2611.
Id.
50 U.S.C. § 421 (Supp. 1990).
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be made for suppressing truth in other settings. The issue that remains for
us is the basis of that difference, and its constitutional status. It is just that
question with which I propose to conclude these comments.
From its earliest tests, free expression has been qualified by a finding
of "clear and present danger." While the focus has always been upon the
degree of harm that may be posed to the national security-or some other
cognizable interest such as public order-truth has played at least some role
in the equation from the start. We often forget that when Justice Holmes
offered his maxim about shouting in a crowded theater, his malefactor was
one who falsely cried fire and thereby created a panic. Truth offered for
him an absolute defense, at least in this setting. If the place really is on
fire, the one who warns others is hero rather than villain, panic or not.
Justice Holmes also wanted us to look at the result; apparently even a
false shout of fire that evoked humor rather than panic would not occasion
criminal liability. But the crucial question for us is the one on the other
side-when, if ever, truthful statements that endanger national security may
warrant civil or criminal liability for the speaker or publisher. We do have
limited guidance in recent years.
In fact the recent testing ground for national security and truthful
speech has not been that of punishment after the fact, but restraint before
publication. Such guidance as we have comes mainly from cases involving
attempts to enjoin presumably truthful publications. Most helpful is the
case of the Pentagon Papers-the government's unsuccessful attempt in
1971 to prevent publication by the New York Times of the purloined copy
of a detailed and potentially embarrassing analysis of the United States role
in Vietnam.30
A clear majority of the Justices agreed that the government could not
prevent publication of the papers simply because they might embarrass our
relations with friendly nations."a But they were far from agreement on the
scope of such a judgment. Only Justices Black and Douglas took the
absolute position that prior restraint was never acceptable. 2 Justice Brennan
wanted to leave open the possibility of enjoining publication, in extremis,
of information such as the itinerary of a "troop ship already at sea" an
example the Court had cited many years earlier in another case involving
prior restraint. 3 Justice Marshall agreed, in part because he felt there were
adequate forms of subsequent punishment to make prior restraint unnecessary. 34 Justices Stewart and White, the other members of the majority,
agreed that government must let the material appear and pursue postpublication remedies if the feared consequences did occur.3 5

30. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
31. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. at 723-24.
32. Id. at 714.

33. Id. at 724.
34. Id. at 740.
35. Id. at 730.
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Thus the Pentagon Papers yield only two votes against any prior
restraint. For the other seven Justices, in varying degree, even truthful
statements might be so damaging to national security that even prior
restraint, let alone subsequent punishment, might be warranted. Even for
so ardent an advocate of free expression as Justice Brennan-whose views
I find understandably congenial-the first amendment does not unqualifiedly
preclude restraint of the truth, at least under critical wartime conditions.
In fact the relationship between truth and national security is even more
complex. If one publishes the wrong address for a United States agent in
a foreign capital, or misstates the itinerary of the troop ship at sea, far less
damage is done. Such false statements might even aid the national interestconfusing or diverting the enemy, for example. This is not to say that truth
is irrelevant here-recall Justice Holmes and the crowded theater againbut only that the needs of national security may more clearly outweigh the
interest in free expression when truth is involved. Thus one who would
permit prior restraint-and a fortiori punishment after the fact-in such a
case is not rejecting the defense of truth but simply balancing contending
interests with truth as a major factor on both sides.
If there is a gap in this area, it is the absence of standards by which
we can determine when information about an agent's foreign address or
the path of a troop ship is so sensitive that it may be proscribed. Perhaps
that is simply part of the generality and the perennially disappointing nature
of the clear and present danger test-a topic that would carry us well
beyond where we should conclude this evening. Suffice it to say that truth
is not irrelevant here, but simply that it plays a quite different role from
that which we have observed elsewhere-even in areas such as the administration of justice in which the governmental interest is of a very high
order.
V.

CONCLUSION

We began with a question I styled as simple-does the First Amendment
always protect publication of the truth? We conclude with a less than fully
satisfying "that depends." But along the way we have identified a few
points of clarity, and a few others in need of clarification.
Let me conclude with several observations:
First, the issue of truth simply is irrelevant to certain kinds of free
expression cases-those involving obscenity or child pornography, for example, and quite possibly others as well. Truthfulness would presumably
represent no defense, and courts would be unlikely to inquire into the issue
of veracity.
Second, there are areas in which truth ought to avail more than
apparently is now the case. The Hubbard copyright case suggests the need
for a broader definition of fair use or related defense that would better
reconcile the interests of creator and general public than some recent cases
allow. There must always be a balance, as long as both interests are firmly
rooted in the Constitution, and vindication of copyright claims will sometimes inevitably require suppression of truthful material.
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Third, publication of truth almost always should prevail against such
contending interests as privacy and the administration of justice. The
situations in which truth may give rise to liability are so few and so
extraordinary that they exist only in hypotheticals-though the case that is
supposition today has a way of becoming tomorrow's litigation.
Finally, the balance in the national security area is sui generis. Truth
is not irrelevant, but the interest in preserving government or public order
may enjoy a higher and unique level of deference. Paradoxically, the public
interest in restraint may be greater when truth is involved than when the
information is false. One can only ask that truth be considered if and when
such an issue is raised-so that all may understand the special conditions
in which the truth may indeed not set you free.

